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Agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa has been a qualified success.  Total factor
productivity growth has increased rapidly since the early 1980s.  By the early 2000s, average annual
TFP growth was roughly four times faster than it had been 25 years earlier.  This period of accelerated
growth, however, followed nearly 20 years of declining rates of TFP growth subsequent to independence
in the early 1960s.  Average agricultural TFP growth for sub-Saharan Africa was 0.14% per year during
1960 – 84, and increased to 1.24% per year from 1985 – 2002.  The average over this period was approximately
0.6% per year, which accounts for 36% of the increase in total crop output over this period.  These
highly aggregated results conceal substantial regional and country-level variation.  Expenditures on
agricultural R&D, along with the reform of macroeconomic and sectoral policies shaping agricultural
incentives, have played a substantial role in explaining both the decline and the rise in agricultural








"Measuring technical change is of interest because, in a sense, it defines our wealth and puts 
limits on what we can accomplish...Since our ability to accumulate additional conventional 
resources...maybe limited, the growth of the economy and of per capita income and wealth 
depends on the rate at which technological knowledge is expanding..." (Zvi Griliches, 1987, p. 
1010) 
 
1.  Introduction 
  Agricultural productivity is central to the lives of most Africans.  Two-thirds of the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa is rural, and the FAO counts nearly half of sub-Saharan 
Africa's rural population as "economically active" in agriculture.  For some countries, such as 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burkina Faso, the rural population share approaches 85-90%, 
with 45-50% the total population counted as economically active in agriculture.  Even among the 
most urbanized countries of sub-Saharan Africa, such as South Africa, one-third of the 
population remains rural.  In addition, up to 80% of Africa's poor live in rural areas, nearly all of 
whom work primarily in agriculture (World Bank, 2000).  For these producer groups, 
agricultural productivity is the key determinant of welfare, and agricultural productivity growth 
is the key hope for poverty reduction (at least in the short- to medium-term).  Non-farm rural 
employment, too, is often closely linked to agriculture -- either directly (as in the marketing of 
agricultural inputs and outputs), or indirectly (as in the provision of other services in rural 
markets).  The indirect benefits of agricultural productivity growth, in the form of lower food 
prices, are also critical to the welfare of Africa's rapidly expanding urban populations, the 
poorest of whom devote 60-70% of total expenditures to food (Sahn, et. al., 1997).  
   From a macroeconomic perspective, as well, agriculture continues to play a central role 
in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 15% of total value added (20%, excluding South Africa).  
Of course, every generalization about sub-Saharan Africa and masks the region’s vast 3 
 
heterogeneity.  In Liberia, for example, agriculture accounts for 66% of total value added, while 
in other countries, such as oil-rich Angola, agriculture accounts for only 10% of the value added 
(World Bank, 2010). 
  African organizations, themselves, highlight these issues.  The Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program of the New Partnership for Africa's Development has stated 
that, "High and sustained rates of agricultural growth, largely driven by productivity growth, will 
be necessary if African countries are to accelerate poverty reduction.  This is because agricultural 
growth has powerful leverage effects on the rest of the economy...The poor performance of the 
agricultural sector explains much of the slow progress towards reducing poverty and hunger in 
Africa."  (CAADP, 2006)  Current efforts to promote a "new Green Revolution" in Africa face 
myriad environmental, institutional, and physical challenges in their quest to promote 
agricultural productivity growth in the region. 
  This paper provides new estimates of cross-country agricultural productivity growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  The resulting picture is one of qualified success.  Total factor productivity 
growth in African agriculture has accelerated dramatically since the early 1980s.  By the early 
2000s, average annual total factor productivity growth in African agriculture was over four times 
faster than it had been 25 years earlier.  The success is qualified by the finding that much of this 
acceleration represents a recovery from the substantial decline in TFP growth rates during the 
1960s and early 1970s.  In addition, levels of output per hectare and per worker in African 
agriculture remain low by global standards.  Among a range of potential explanations for 
agricultural productivity growth in agriculture, expenditures on agricultural R&D play a 
dominant role, followed by policy distortions at both the macroeconomic and sectoral levels.  4 
 
Improvements in the quality of the labor force, as indicated by average years of schooling, have 
also played a central role in driving productivity growth in African agriculture. 
  Many of these findings gleaned from cross-country analysis, are also evident in this 
paper's more detailed examination of agricultural productivity in Ghana.   
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews related studies.  Section 3 
describes data used in the cross-country analysis, as well as the approach used to aggregate 
agricultural output across multiple commodities.  Section 4 provides a preliminary perspective 
on agricultural productivity trends in the form of partial productivity ratios (output per worker 
and per hectare).  Sections 5 and 6 describe, respectively, my methodology for estimating total 
factor productivity growth and my results.  Section 7 explores various explanations for the 
productivity results presented in the previous section.  Section 8 presents a brief case study of 
agricultural productivity in Ghana, while Section 9 concludes.  
2.  Related Studies  
  Within the broader literature on cross-country agricultural productivity, relatively few 
papers have focused specifically on sub-Saharan Africa.  Block (1994) was the first to report a 
recovery of aggregate agricultural TFP in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s, a result 
confirmed by a number of subsequent studies.  Block attributed up to two-thirds of this recovery 
to investments in agricultural R&D and to macroeconomic policy reform.  Frisvold and Ingram 
(1995) provide an early growth accounting exercise for land productivity, concluding that most 
of it (up to 1985) resulted from increased input use (labor, in particular).  Thirtle, Hadley, and 
Townsend (1995) highlight the role of policy choices, finding that an index of real agricultural 
protection played a significant role in explaining TFP growth in African agriculture for the 5 
 
period 1971-86.  Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) highlight the role of agricultural R&D in explaining 
TFP growth in Africa.  They also highlight the role of increasing population pressure in driving 
increased agricultural productivity in Africa.  Chan-Kang, et. al. (1999) focus on the 
determinants of labor productivity in a cross-country African setting.  They, too, find land per 
unit of labor to be an important determinant of labor productivity. 
  Fulginiti, Perrin, and Yu (2004) estimate agricultural TFP growth for 41 sub-Saharan 
African countries from 1960 to 1999, finding an average TFP growth rate of 0.83% per year, and 
confirming the finding from Block (1994) of an acceleration of the agricultural TFP growth since 
the mid-1980s.  Their analysis concentrates on the role of institutions in explaining this growth.  
They conclude that former British colonies experienced greater rates of TFP growth, while 
former Portuguese colonies experienced lower rates.  They also found negative effects for 
political conflicts and wars, and positive effects resulting from political rights and civil liberties.  
Three more recent papers conclude this review. 
  Nin-Pratt and Yu (2008) reconfirm the acceleration of African agricultural TFP growth 
since the mid-1980s.  They find, however, a negative average growth rate of agricultural TFP (-
0.15% per year) from 1964 to 2003, casting the recovery period as making up for negative 
productivity growth during the 1960s and 70s.  Specifically, Nin-Pratt and Yu find that average 
TFP growth fell at the rate of -2% per year from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, then grew by 
1.7% per year between 1985 and 2003.  They, too, highlight the role policy change in explaining 
this reversal in performance.  In particular, they find that an indicator of reforms associated with 
structural adjustment played a positive role.  In addition, they find that agricultural productivity 
in East and Southern Africa benefited from the end of internal conflicts, and that agriculture in 6 
 
West Africa benefited from the devaluation of the CFA franc.  They also provide suggestive 
evidence of the positive effect of investments in agricultural R&D. 
  Alene (2010) also focuses on the contributions of R&D expenditures to productivity 
growth in African agriculture.  In contrast to the average TFP growth rate reported by Nin-Pratt 
and Yu (2008), Alene finds an average TFP growth rate of 1.8% per year for the period 1970-
2004 (a difference that he attributes to an improved estimation technique).  Alene finds strong 
positive effects of lagged R&D expenditure on agricultural productivity growth, arguing that 
rapid growth in R&D expenditures during the 1970s helped to explain strong productivity 
growth after the mid-1980s, while slower growth of R&D expenditures in the 1980s and early 
1990s led to slower productivity growth since 2000.  Alene (2010) also notes a 33% annual rate 
of return on investments in agricultural R&D in Africa. 
  Most recently, Fuglie (2010) examines agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa from 1961 to 2006.  His findings are mixed.  While he reports an increased rate of growth 
in agricultural output during the 1990s and early 2000s, Fuglie finds that most of this growth in 
output is explained by expanding crop land rather than improved productivity.  Fuglie (2010) 
stands out in this literature for his critical assessment of the standard data sources, for which he 
proposes various corrections.  In contrast to previous studies, Fuglie does not find a general 
recovery of agricultural productivity in recent decades.  For the period 1961-2006, he reports an 
average TFP growth rate of 0.58% per year, with the lowest rate occurring during the 1970s (-
0.18% per year), and the highest rate occurring during the 1990s (1.17% per year). 
  Thus, recent estimates of the rate of agricultural TFP growth in Africa differ widely, 
though there is a general consensus surrounding a decline in productivity during the first two 7 
 
decades following independence and a recovery during the past two decades.  These studies 
applied different methodologies to essentially the same data set, which may explain some of the 
conflicting findings cited above.  As described below, the methodology applied in the present 
study differs from all of the studies cited above. 
3.  Data and Output Aggregation 
  This study combines data from a variety of sources.  The core data on agricultural outputs 
and inputs are drawn from the FAO online database.  While often regarded as being of limited 
quality, these data are ubiquitous in studies of international agricultural productivity, as they are 
the only comprehensive and detailed source of cross-country data over a long period of time.  
The central challenge in constructing a data set suitable for estimating a cross-country 
agricultural production function lies in aggregating the output of multiple agricultural 
commodities in a way that is comparable across both time and space.  The fact that national-level 
data on key agricultural inputs -- land, labor, fertilizer, tractors, and livestock -- are provided as 
national totals, and not disaggregated by the crops to which they are applied, requires that 
agricultural output also be aggregated to the national level. 
  The most comprehensive discussion of agricultural output aggregation for international 
comparison is Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1991).  Drawing on index number theory, they note 
that the ideal approach to aggregating multiple commodities for a given country and year would 
be to multiply a vector of base-year local commodity prices expressed in dollars by a vector of 
quantities of individual commodities.  In particular, they specify that the best price weights 
would be those most specific to the economic activity and agents in question.  Yet, even in the 
absence of data constraints, there is no perfect way to implement this ideal.  The key dimensions 8 
 
of the problem, in practice, lie in choosing appropriate deflator's for comparisons over time, and 
in choosing appropriate exchange rates for comparisons across countries.  Severe constraints on 
the availability of commodity-specific price data over time for each country in sub-Saharan 
Africa add to these challenges of constructing internationally and inter-temporally comparable 
agricultural output aggregates. 
  Given the availability of commodity-specific local currency-denominated prices over 
time, the standard approach for converting aggregate output in a given year into internationally 
comparable units of measure is to select a numeraire currency, and to use Purchasing Power 
Parity exchange rates for conversion.
1  For its global agricultural data set, the FAO has 
calculated "agricultural exchange rates," or agricultural PPPs, that it applies in creating 
internationally comparable aggregates of agricultural output.  In practice, virtually every study of 
international agricultural productivity (whether global or region-specific) simply uses these FAO 
data, based on PPP prices calculated from the global data set.  In theory, however, as noted 
above, the best price weights to use in aggregating output are those that are most specific to the 
particular setting of concern. 
 The present study thus departs from standard practice by calculating a unique set of 
international commodity prices and PPP exchange rates specific to African agriculture. 
  In order to calculate the Africa-specific international prices and PPP exchange rates used 
to construct the data set for this study, I applied the Geary-Khamis method summarized by Rao 
(1993).  This method requires calculating both a reference set of international commodity prices 
based on relevant PPP exchange rates, and calculating the PPP exchange rates based on the 
                                                            
1 Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1991) provide an extensive discussion of the trade-offs involved in first deflating 
and then converting each year aggregate output versus first converting in any deflating. 9 
 
reference set of international commodity prices.  This problem is described by a system of two 
simultaneous equations.  In the first equation, the international reference price for commodity i is 
calculated as a function of its local currency price in each country j = 1,…,m converted by the 
PPP exchange rate for country j.  In the second equation, the PPP exchange rate for country j is 
calculated as a function of the quantities and international reference prices for each commodity i 
= 1,…,n  in country j.  This is done for a given base year.  These two equations can be solved 
iteratively, ultimately converging on a unique set of reference prices and PPP exchange rates for 
the specific countries and commodities to be studied.  For purposes of this study, I calculated 
international prices and PPP exchange rates using prices and quantities for the n = 35 
commodities in the m = 27 sub-Saharan African countries for which data were available from the 
FAO.
2  I then applied these reference prices in aggregating output across these commodities for 
the full set of 44 sub-Saharan African countries for which commodity-specific output data were 
available.  Output data for each commodity are net of quantities used for seed and feed. 
  The base year for these reference prices was 2006.  I then created a Paasche-type output 
index, applying the 2006 prices to aggregate the commodity output data in each country for each 
year going back to 1961.  The rationale for applying the Paasche approach was that the range 
and, in particular, the quality of the price data has tended to improve over time, and that the best 
data would thus be the most recent.
3   
  Data for the other standard inputs to be used in estimating the agricultural production 
function are also drawn from the FAO database.  The land measure is hectares of permanent and 
arable crop land; the labor measure is the number of economically active males and females in 
                                                            
2 Appendix 1 presents the list of commodities and countries used in calculating the Africa-specific international 
prices.  Resulting output data for each country-year are available on request from the author. 
3 I am grateful to Philip Pardey for suggesting this approach. 10 
 
agriculture; capital is represented by the number of tractors; fertilizer is measured in tons of 
inorganic plant nutrient; and, livestock is measured as the number of “cattle equivalents” held on 
farms for productive use.
4   
  Each of these indicators of agricultural inputs falls short of the ideal data for measuring 
agricultural productivity.  In discussing the measurement problems generically associated 
productivity analysis, Griliches (1960, 1987) has noted that proper estimation of production 
functions should be based the flow of services of capital (accounting for vintage) in constant 
prices, as well as on the flow of labor services (e.g., hours worked) weighting different types of 
labor by their marginal prices.  Clearly, the input data available for African agriculture, 
consisting of counts of the number of tractors and the number of agricultural workers (issues of 
data quality aside), fall far short of this ideal.  In particular, the assumption in the data that all of 
what is counted as agricultural labor is specifically on-farm labor contradicts micro-based 
evidence of significant non-farm rural activity (Liedholm, McPherson, and Chuta, 1994).  Over-
counting labor in this way may impose a downward bias on estimated TFP growth.  There must 
also be substantial measurement error in fertilizer data that capture only inorganic fertilizer in a 
setting where manure is the primary source of added soil nutrients. 
  In short, the methodological tradeoffs and measurement errors inevitably associated with 
constructing both the output and the input data for African agriculture are substantial, and 
suggest the potential for significant noise and bias in estimates of total factor productivity.  Yet, 
as demonstrated in the seminal work of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), it is possible to mitigate 
these problems by introducing explicit controls for the quality of inputs. 
                                                            
4 Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997) note, for example, that up to 70% of total horsepower traction in 
African agriculture is provided by livestock. 11 
 
  As described below, the quality of inputs differs across countries and over time within 
countries.  To the limited extent possible, it is important to control for these differences by 
including input quality adjustments in productivity estimates.  Data used here to adjust for 
variations in land quality include the proportion of permanent and arable crop land that is 
irrigated, and annual rainfall.  The former are drawn from data compiled by Sebastion (2007).  
The annual rainfall data used in this study are drawn from Mitchell, et. al. (2003) and Jefferson 
and O’Connell (2004), based on the crop-weighting scheme of Ramankutty and Foley (1998).
5  
Quality adjustments to the agricultural labor force generally rely on literacy rates.  This study 
takes advantage of newly-released data on average years of schooling from Barro and Lee 
(2010).  Additional data used in trying to decompose the productivity residual are described 
below. 
4.  Partial Productivity Ratios 
  Partial productivity ratios (output per worker, and output per hectare) provide a useful 
initial overview of both the level and growth rate of agricultural productivity.  While these ratios 
share the analytical limitation of not controlling for changes in other inputs, they have the virtue 
of reflecting the general nature of technical change and agriculture as being predominantly either 
land- or labor-saving.  The simplicity of partial productivity ratios may also be a benefit in a 
preliminary analysis of noisy and often low-quality data. 
  Hayami and Ruttan (1985) present a useful and intuitive conceptual approach for 
analyzing joint trends in partial productivity ratios, based on the simple identity 
                                                            
5 These rainfall data, along with detailed explanations of their construction, are available at: 
http://acadweb.swarthmore.edu/acad/rain-econ/Framesets/CountryAggregated.htm 12 
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where Y is output, A is area, and L is labor.  Taking logarithms of this identity facilitates thinking 
in terms of relative changes, as in 
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  The welfare of Africa's agricultural labor force ultimately depends on increasing output 
per worker.  Equation (2) illustrates the challenge to that process in an environment characterized 
by rapid population growth and limited land area.  To the extent that population growth outpaces 
the rate of expansion of agricultural area, area per worker (A/L) declines, thus increasing the 
challenge of raising average labor productivity (Y/L) by means of increasing average yield (Y/A).  
This dynamic has been a major obstacle to agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
  Table 1 presents the growth rates of partial productivity ratios for sub-Saharan Africa and 
its sub-regions by decade from 1961 to 2007.  For the region as a whole over this entire period 
the average annual growth rate of output per worker has been only 0.41%, despite an average 
annual growth rate of 1.24% in output per hectare.  As suggested by equation (2), the limited 
ability of yield growth in African agriculture to drive growth in average labor productivity has 
been driven by the increasing population density of rural Africa, where the annual growth of the 
agricultural labor force has outpaced area expansion by 0.83% per year from 1961 to 2007.  Yet, 
recent years demonstrate a more optimistic trend.  For the period 2001 to 2007, the growth rate 
of average labor productivity in African agriculture has increased dramatically (to over 2% per 
year) relative to previous periods -- an advance aided by a reversal of the historical trend towards 
declining area per worker. 13 
 
  In their seminal study of agricultural development, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) also 
developed a useful and intuitive graphical presentation of partial productivity ratios.  Their 
graphical representation of equation (2) simultaneously relates changes over time in average land 
and labor productivity by measuring average land productivity along the vertical axis and 
average labor productivity along the horizontal axis.  Changes in output per hectare and output 
per worker over a given period can be illustrated by drawing an arrow between the relevant 
beginning and ending coordinates in that space.  Scaling the axes in logarithms conveniently 
implies that movements along any 45° line represent equal rates of change in both land and labor 
productivity.  From equation (2), it follows that such equal rates of change imply a constant level 
of area per worker.  Thus, each 45° line in this space represents a unique and constant level of 
A/L.  Partial productivity paths steeper than 45° reflect increased rural population density over 
time. 
  Timmer (1988) provides various interpretations of movements over time in this space.  
He notes, for example that a movement due north (indicating growth in yield with no growth in 
average output per worker) may indicate population growth matched by increased yields through 
higher labor inputs and technical change, but no improvement in rural living standards.  
Movements to the northwest might suggest population growth faster than technical change in 
raising yields, with a consequent deterioration in rural living standards.  In contrast, movements 
due east in this space might reflect a declining agricultural workforce with no changes in yields, 
but with new mechanical technologies needed to maintain output with fewer workers, hence 
increasing average labor productivity and rural welfare. 
  Figure 1 implements this framework, placing African agriculture in a global context.  The 
partial productivity paths depicted in Figure 1 illustrate changes from 1961/65 (period average) 14 
 
to 2001/05, distinguishing the coordinates also at 1981/85 for sub-Saharan Africa and other 
middle-income and advanced economies.  The positions of these paths reflect different levels of 
land and labor productivity, while their lengths indicate rates of change.  It is clear from Figure 1 
that Africa begins and ends this period with levels of land and labor productivity that are quite 
low in comparison with those found in more advanced economies, as well as in comparison with 
the world averages.  Stated differently, African agriculture falls well within the meta-production 
frontier defined here by Japan, Germany, USA, and Australia.  Productivity growth in African 
agriculture, as reflected in these partial productivity ratios, has been driven almost entirely by 
increased yields per hectare, with little growth of output per worker.  This results in a path 
substantially steeper than the 45° line, indicating that rural Africa has grown increasingly 
crowded.   
  While during the second half of this period sub-Saharan Africa reflects a slightly 
increased rate of growth in average labor productivity, that progress remains quite small by 
comparison with the other countries illustrated in Figure 1.   Note as well, that those countries 
with the most rapid increases in agricultural labor productivity have followed paths shallower 
than the 45° lines, indicating increases in area per worker over time. 
  Figure 2 intensifies the focus on partial productivity ratios in Africa, disaggregating by 
five sub-regions and the averages of successive five-year periods.
6  Consistent with the data 
presented in Table 1, no region of sub-Saharan Africa experienced continuous growth in both 
land and labor productivity, though some regions were clearly more successful than others.  
Southern Africa, for example, began in the early 1960s at a relatively low level of output per 
                                                            
6 For purposes of global comparison, output in Figure 1 was measured in constant agricultural value-added.  
Beginning with Figure 2, as discussed in the text, output is measured as aggregate crop output calculated for this 
study. 15 
 
worker, yet experienced the fastest rate of subsequent growth (averaging 1.24% per year, per 
Table 1), though with a significant setback between 1986/90 and 1991/95.  West Africa, too, 
made substantial progress in increasing agricultural labor productivity beginning in the early 
1980s.  In contrast, Sahelian countries began with the lowest level of average labor productivity 
in 1961/65, and saw that level decline consistently (along with yields) until at least the early 
1980s.  Similarly, countries in Middle Africa experienced slow declines in agricultural labor 
productivity until the early 1990s, while countries in Eastern Africa experienced consistent but 
relatively slow increases in both land and labor productivity over most of the period.
7  These 
contrasting experiences, even at the regional level, illustrate the great heterogeneity of African 
agriculture.  This heterogeneity pertains both to conditions and to rates of progress over time.  
(Note, for example, the substantially greater level of average area per worker in southern Africa 
as compared with Eastern Africa.) 
  Figures 3 (a – d) underscore this country-level heterogeneity.  Figure 3a presents country-
level partial productivity paths for Western Africa over the period 1961/65 to 2001/05.  Some 
countries, such as Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin experienced significant growth in average 
labor productivity accompanied by moderate growth in crop yield, while other countries, such as 
Togo, Niger, and Liberia experienced gains in crop yield accompanied by small reductions in 
average labor productivity.  At the same time, Figure 3a depicts rapid declines in agricultural 
labor productivity in Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau.  Among countries in Eastern Africa 
(Figure 3b), there was the predominant tendency towards moderate gains in crop yield 
accompanied by slow growth in output per worker.  Figures 3c and 3d depict a similar 
                                                            
7 Note here that the East African countries begin with relatively high levels of rural population density (reflected in 
their position along a higher 45° line) follow a relatively steep path over time, indicating a tendency towards land-
saving technical change.  This is consistent with the Induced Innovation Hypothesis, associated with Hayami and 
Ruttan (1985). 16 
 
heterogeneity of experience among the countries of Middle and Southern Africa, respectively.  
Table 2 presents partial productivity growth rates by country, and ranks countries in order of 
their growth rates of both land and labor productivity. 
  In general, these patterns (particularly at the level of regional disaggregation) conform to 
what is known of events on the ground.  Gabre-Mahdin and Haggblade (2004) provide an 
interesting perspective on successes in African agriculture.  They conducted a survey of over 100 
experts working in various areas related to African agriculture (two-thirds of whom were 
Africans), asking them to identify the most important factors in advancing African agriculture.  
The majority (62%) pointed to successes tied to specific commodities; 21% identified activities 
such as policy reform and enhancement of soil fertility; and, 16% cited successful institution-
building efforts as the primary drivers of African agriculture.  Maize breeding (followed by 
cassava breeding) was the most widely-cited contributor.  Byerlee and Jewell (1997) report that 
most of the successes in breeding, releasing, in adopting improved maize varieties was in East 
and Southern Africa.  Between 1966 and 1990, Byerlee and Jewell note the release of over 300 
improved varieties and hybrids by national maize research programs.   
  The release of hybrid maize in Africa dates back to the early 1930s in Zimbabwe (then 
Southren Rhodesia), though there were no major successes until the release in Zimbabwe of the 
variety SR52 in 1960.  Successful hybrid maize releases followed shortly thereafter in Kenya.    
Byerlee and Jewell (1997) report widely varying results for the adoption of maize hybrids and 
improved open-pollinated varieties.  By 1990, nearly all of Zimbabwe's maize area was planted 
to hybrids, as was 70% of Kenya's maize area, and 77% of Zambia's maize area.  At the same 
time however, Malawian farmers had planted only 14% of maize area to improve varieties, 
similar to the 18% of Mozambique's maize area, and 13-29% of Ethiopia's maize area under 17 
 
improve varieties.  Byerlee and Jewell also note that even in countries with substantial areas 
devoted to improved maize varieties, yield gains were often moderated by declining soil fertility 
combined with extremely limited application of chemical fertilizer.  Kumwenda, et. al. (1997) 
cite declining soil fertility as the most widespread limitation on both yield improvement in the 
sustainability of the maize-based production systems in Southern and Eastern Africa.     
  Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade’s (2004) survey reinforces the specific success of maize 
breeding programs in East and Southern Africa, where by the turn of the century, they reported 
that 58% of maize area planted to improved hybrids with yields gains of about 40% over local 
varieties.  In contrast, only about 20% of total maize area in West and Central Africa were 
planted to improve varieties.  Those regions were more dominated by improved open-pollinating 
varieties, with output gains of 15-45% over local varieties.   
  Evenson and Gollin (2003) track the annual rate of varietal releases for all improved crop 
varieties.  While not disaggregating by regions within Africa, they do report a near doubling of 
the number of average annual releases between 1976-80 and 1981-85, from 23 to 43.2 (and to 50 
per year by the early 1990s).  This accelerated release of improved crop varieties coincides with 
the acceleration in the growth of both partial productivity ratios reported in Table 1. 
  Other important sources of success in African agriculture cited in the survey included 
breeding to combat mosaic virus in cassava, as well as improvements in the yield and drought-
resistance of that crop (which is particularly important in West and Central Africa); expansion of 
horticultural and flower exports from East and Southern Africa; rapid growth of cotton 
production and exports from West Africa (the Sahelian countries in particular); and, improved 
breeding of bananas in Central Africa.  Among activity-led successes, Gabre-Madhin and 18 
 
Haggblade’s survey noted soil fertility enhancement, such as alley cropping in West Africa and 
improved water management techniques in Southern Africa.  Respondents also noted the positive 
effects of market reforms, currency devaluation, and improved institutions as contributors to 
Africa's improved agricultural performance. 
  Partial productivity ratios, while indicative of broad trends in the rate and nature of 
productivity growth, are limited by their lack of control for potentially confounding changes in 
other inputs.  The remaining sections of this paper thus turn to the estimation of total factor 
productivity growth in African agriculture. 
5.  Measuring Total Factor Productivity Growth in Agriculture: 
Methodology 
  The rate of growth of total factor productivity (TFP) is conventionally defined as the 
difference between the rate of growth of real product and the rate of growth of real factor input.  
Assuming, as in Solow (1957), competitive factor markets and constant returns to scale in the 
aggregate production function, a change in total factor productivity can be measured as a vertical 
shift in the production function.  A variety of methodological approaches have evolved for 
estimating total factor productivity growth, including the construction of TFP indices (such as 
the Tornquist-Theil), data envelopment analysis (based on the non-parametric Malmquist index), 
and stochastic frontier analysis, in addition to the econometric estimation of the aggregate 
production function.  TFP estimation in the present study is based on the latter approach of 
estimating the aggregate agricultural production function for a panel of African countries.
8  One 
                                                            
8 Tornquist-Theil indices require detailed factor price data that are unavailable for African agriculture.  Stochastic 
frontier approaches derive their results entirely by imposing very strong conditions on the error structure of the 
estimated production function -- an approach that seems particularly ill-suited to the present setting, which is 19 
 
key benefit of a parametric approach is that it helps to impose order in an otherwise noisy data 
set. 
  Specifying the aggregate agricultural production function requires numerous choices, 
beginning with functional form.  I adopt the Cobb-Douglas functional form, which has been 
repeatedly validated in agricultural studies (Griliches, 1964; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985), as has 
been the assumption of constant returns to scale (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  The "traditional" 
inputs included in virtually every cross-country study of agricultural productivity include: land, 
labor, fertilizer, tractors, and livestock.  As noted above, available data for each of these inputs 
almost certainly include significant measurement error.  In addition, as emphasized in the early 
studies of US agriculture by Griliches (1963, 1964), and for the US economy as a whole by 
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), much of what might mistakenly be attributed to TFP growth 
may in reality be changes over time in the quality of inputs. 
  Whether one puts such adjustments for input quality in the production function or in the 
residual is an interesting question.  Griliches (1960) takes an agnostic approach, suggesting 
"Whether or not we want the input measures to cover all possible quality changes is a semantic 
rather than a substantive issue.  Hybrid seed corn can be viewed either as improvement in the 
quality of seed or as ‘technical change.’ Since we are interested in explaining the growth of 
agricultural output, it does not matter much whether we put it into the ‘input change’ category or 
the ‘productivity change’ category as long as we put it somewhere and know where it is." 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
characterized by low quality and quite noisy data.  The data envelopment analysis approach, while often used in 
recent studies of agricultural productivity (Lusigi and Thirtle, 1997; Fulginiti, Perrin, and Yu, 2004; and Nin-Pratt 
and Yu, 2008; and Alene, 2010, among others), is also problematic.  Heady, Alauddin, and Prasada Rao (2010), 
along with Nin-Pratt, et. al. (2003), note that DEA studies of agricultural TFP often produce anomalous and 
implausible results.  The DEA approach measures countries' progress relative to a productivity frontier, which 
depends arbitrarily on the number and selection of countries included in the sample, and which is poorly suited to 
distinguish between TFP growth, noisy data, and measurement error.  Coelli, Prasada Rao, O’Donnell, and Battese 
(2005) discuss the relative merits of these approaches. 20 
 
Specification 
  The dependent variable in my aggregate production function is crop output aggregated 
(as described above) based on the Africa-specific international commodity prices and PPP 
exchange rates calculated for this study.  The resulting TFP estimates are thus limited to crop 
agriculture.  This, too, reflects a departure from most of the literature, which typically includes 
both crop and livestock output (summed) for aggregate output.  The median share by value of 
livestock output in total agricultural output over the entire sample is 0.21, though this share 
varies by region and country.   The mean livestock share in total agricultural output is highest in 
the five countries included from southern Africa (0.48), and lowest among the ten included (non-
Sahelian) countries of western Africa (0.17).  For certain countries, including Botswana, Sudan, 
Mali, Mauritania, and Namibia, livestock output accounts for greater than half of the value of 
total agricultural output.  For such countries, excluding livestock is a potentially significant 
omission.  Yet, that omission brings with it the broader benefit of more accurate aggregation of 
output (based on Africa-specific data, which are not available for livestock output).  On average 
this omission is relatively small.  (Appendix 2 demonstrates the robustness of my main results 
compared against those derived from using a broader output aggregate that includes livestock.)   
  There is also a more theoretical reason for excluding livestock from the output aggregate, 
arising largely from the construction and interpretation of the production function itself.  As 
typically specified, with inputs including tractors, fertilizer, livestock (used both for traction and 
as a source of manure), the production function conceptually describes specifically crop output.  
The estimated coefficients on these inputs are interpreted as production elasticities and serve as 
input weights for productivity measurement.  This interpretation of estimated coefficients for 
tractors and fertilizer in particular is clouded by the inclusion of livestock in the dependent 21 
 
variable.  Indeed, by comparison with crop agriculture, livestock production is less labor 
intensive and more land intensive, thus blurring the interpretation of those coefficients, as well.  
Yet, excluding livestock from the dependent variable does come at the cost of under-
emphasizing integrated crop-livestock production systems that have become increasingly 
common in Africa.  Available cross-country data on inputs and output in agriculture provide no 
perfect match between what is included on the left- and right-hand sides of the production 
function.  For instance, while I can (and do) eliminate permanent pasture from my measure of 
land, the labor variable still includes labor applied to livestock production.
9 
  Prior to specifying and estimating the cross-country production function, it is useful to 
present the growth rates of output and inputs.  Table 3 presents these growth rates, distinguishing 
the periods before and after 1985.  Crop output for the entire period 1961 to 2007 grew at an 
average rate of just over 2% per year, accelerating post-1985.  Growth of the agricultural labor 
force was also stable, at about 1.65% per year.  Agricultural area also expanded at a relatively 
stable 0.85% per year.  What is striking, however, is the dramatic reversal in the growth rates of 
the number of tractors and tons of chemical fertilizers pre- and post-1985, a break-point that may 
reflect the widespread onset of structural adjustment and related reforms.  From 1961 to 1984, 
the average growth rate for tractors and fertilizer were just over 7% and 6%, respectively; yet, 
post-1985, consumption of both fell at an average rate of 0.5% per year. 
  Loosely borrowing notation from Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997), I specify the 
initial production function for country i at time t with k conventional inputs    
     , and a 
country-invariant temporal shift of variable A(t) as: 
                                                            
9 Even if the FAO labor data were to distinguish between crop and livestock labor, they would likely grow at the 
same rate in any given country and year.  As it is ultimately the growth rate of inputs that matters for TFP 
estimation, over-stating the level of labor may have little effect on estimated TFP growth. 22 
 
(3)                      ∏    
   
           
The presence of both quality change and measurement error in the inputs creates a divergence 
between observed inputs and effective inputs.  We can separate out measurable country-specific 
(but time-varying) quality shifters in input j,       , and country-specific but time-invariant 
measurement error in input j,    .  In this case, Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997) note that the 
relationship between observed input        and effective input    
      is given by 
(4)           
                         
Substituting equation (4) into equation (3) and scaling the production function by dividing by 
input        yields 
(5)     
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This production function imposes constant returns to scale across the conventional inputs.   The 
production elasticity for variable X1 can be recovered in estimation as    
   1 ∑    
 
 
    .  In 
practice, the scaling variable will be labor.
10   Equation (5) provides the basic production 
function to be estimated in measuring TFP growth, where TFP growth is captured by the 
intertemporal shifts in the production function measured by A(t).  Once having estimated the rate 
of TFP growth, the second stage of the analysis will be to explain that growth.  Towards that end, 
I add to the production function in equation (5) a vector of m potential explanations,       , for 
the observed productivity growth in African agriculture.  
 The final production function can thus be written as 
                                                            
10 Scaling the production function substantially eliminates the heteroskedasticity that would otherwise result from 
combining countries of greatly differing size. 23 
 
(6)    
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Following Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997), in the empirical representation of equation (6) I 
replace A(t) with time period dummies, TD(s).  These time dummies track vertical shifts of the 
production function over time, and thus provide a basis for estimating the rate of TFP growth.  I 
also aggregate the input- and country-specific measurement error into composite time-invariant 
country-specific dummies, CDh .  Expressing all but the dummy variables in natural logs (as 
lower-case letters) in per worker terms leads to the estimating equation: 
(7)              ∑             
    ∑            ∑            ∑          
   
 
   
 
     
                         ∑      
   
          
  In practice, data constraints limit the number of input quality adjusting variables to fewer 
than the number of inputs.  Thus, the Z variables to be used include two adjustments for land 
quality (annual rainfall and percentage of land equipped for irrigation), and one variable to adjust 
for the quality of the labor force (average years of schooling, from Barro and Lee, 2010). 
Estimation Strategy 
  I implement two different econometric approaches to deriving the rate of TFP growth 
from the estimation of equation (7).
11  The strategy will be first to estimate the production 
function including only conventional inputs and the country and period dummy variables (that is, 
imposing the constraints          0 ).  I then derive the input quality-adjusted estimates of TFP 
                                                            
11 In theory there is some risk of endogeneity in estimating production functions if for example farmers choose 
observed inputs as a function of unobserved inputs.  Estimating fixed effects models, such as that proposed here, 
helps to the extent that these unobserved effects are constant over time.  Fuglie (2010) estimates a cross-country 
agricultural production function both with and without instrumental variables, but finds little difference between the 
two approaches. 24 
 
growth by re-estimating equation (7), this time including the Z variables (relaxing the constraint 
that     0 ).  The resulting quality-adjusted TFP estimates provide the baseline against which I 
decompose this productivity residual into various explanations for productivity growth. 
  A key practical consideration in deriving TFP growth estimates from equation (7) is to 
distinguish trends in true productivity from the substantial noise inherent in these data.  
Productivity growth is ultimately measured as a reflection of the deeper process of technical 
change, which in principle does not fluctuate dramatically from year to year (Griliches, 1987). 
Given the heavy reliance of African agriculture on rainfall in particular, some form of smoothing 
is essential.  This study applies two alternative econometric approaches to address this problem. 
  The most common approach for addressing this problem, given the availability of panel 
data, has been to collapse the annual cross sections into successive five-year averages.  While 
somewhat ad hoc and potentially sensitive to the starting and ending years chosen, this approach 
is effective in smoothing out annual fluctuations.  In deriving TFP measures from the estimation 
of equation (7), I begin with this approach.  Having annual data from 1961 – 2007 permits the 
creation of nine full cross sections of five-year averages.  I then introduce a novel approach to 
deriving TFP estimates from annual data, based on semi-parametric estimation of the production 
function.  The core idea shared by both approaches is that one can estimate the rate of TFP 
growth directly from vertical shifts in the production function. 
  The first approach applies seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) to a panel data set 
consisting of sequential five-year averages of the annual data.  The strategy here is to specify the 
same production function for each cross section in the panel, using the SURE estimator to apply 
appropriate cross-equation constraints on the parameter estimates for conventional agricultural 25 
 
inputs, leaving the intercept terms unconstrained.  Constraining similar slope terms to be equal 
across pairs of adjacent production functions ensures that the change in the intercepts of the 
production functions between periods reflects vertical shifts of the same production function over 
time.
12  In this case, we can derive estimates of TFP growth directly from changes in the 
intercept terms of adjacent production functions.  My SURE system of production functions thus 
takes the form: 
 
  ,  /        /       ,  /    ,  /       ,  /     ,  /       ,  /     ,  /       ,  /     ,  /       ,  /  
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where (in logs) y is crop output per worker, a is area per worker, tr is tractors per worker, f is 
fertilizer per worker, and lv is livestock per worker. 
  Estimating the rate of TFP growth between 1961/65 and 1966/70 first requires imposing 
(and testing) the constraint   ,  /       ,  /   jointly for all of the conventional inputs.  The rate 
of TFP growth between these periods can then be calculated as 
(8)                                        /        /   ,  
where (given this panel structure) T = 5.  This econometric approach is not common in the 
literature, but was used in Block (1994, 1995). 
                                                            
12 Pair-wise equality constraints of the slope terms in adjacent production functions (e.g., the first two five-year 
periods out of nine, then the second and third periods, etc.) is the minimal requirement for this approach.  The 
maximal approach would be to constrain the slope coefficients for a given inputs to be equal across all time periods 
simultaneously.  Wald tests reject this maximal constraint, yet, as reported in the text, tend not to reject pair-wise 
constraints across adjacent periods. 26 
 
  I also introduce in this paper a novel approach to estimating TFP growth from annual 
panel data.  As noted above, a key concern in estimating TFP growth is to distinguish 
productivity trends from noise.  For this purpose, I propose a semi-parametric approach to 
estimating the production function in equation (7).  This approach controls linearly for the 
conventional inputs while allowing the residual relationship between output and time to take an 
undefined functional form.  This revised production function is thus 
(9)       
                      
 
   
                  
 
   
        
 
   
        
         
   
   
        
  The difference between equation (7) and equation (9) lies in the specified functional 
relationship between output, yi(t), and the year dummies, TD(s).  Equation (7) is fully parametric 
and thus imposes a linear relationship between output and time, estimation of which would 
provide a basis for calculating a single average rate of TFP growth for the period.  In contrast, 
equation (9) retains the linear parametric relationship between output and all other variables 
included in the production function with the exception of the year dummies.  Rather than 
imposing linearity on the relationship between output and the year dummies, the semi-parametric 
specification of equation (9) allows this relationship to take an undefined functional form   · .
13  
This approach allows the estimated rate of TFP growth to vary freely over time, as defined by the 
data themselves, rather than imposing linearity (or any other pre-defined parametric 
specification). 
                                                            
13 Yatchew (2003) provides comprehensive detail on semi-parametric regeression. 27 
 
  To clarify the estimation procedure, combine all the linear arguments in (9) into the 
matrix x, and write the semi-parametric regression as, 
(10)                       
Yatchew (2003) describes that when the data are sorted by z in increasing order of size (and 
assuming that g is a smooth function), then first differencing the data tends to eliminate the 
nonparametric term, g(zi), since the first difference,                        0  as the sample size 
increases.
14  In this case, after first differencing, one can consistently estimate    
     by OLS.  
Then, subtracting the estimated parametric portion of the model from both sides of (10) (as 
Lokshin, 2006, shows), one is left with 
(11)            
                 
                              
since    
     converges to β.  What remains is a two-dimensional purely non-parametric 
relationship between yi and zi, which is estimated by a locally-weighted kernel density smoother 
(using Stata’s lowess command). 
  Thus, estimation of equation (9) effectively partials out the linear effects of the 
conventional inputs and country dummies, leaving a non-parametric kernel regression of output 
on the annual time dummies.  The resulting estimated function,           , is a smoothed non-
parametric representation of annual shifts in the production function, controlling linearly for all 
other variables in equation (9).   
                                                            
14 Also see M. Lokshin (2006) for a detailed exposition of the plreg Stata command commonly used to implement 
this estimator. 28 
 
  Transforming this continuous function into estimates of the instantaneous rate of TFP 
growth requires a calculation analogous to that described by equation (8).  Equation (8) converts 
discrete shifts over time in the intercept of the production function into a rate of change – an 
estimate of the average rate of TFP growth during the period of estimation.  In the semi-
parametric case, the analogous task is to convert the estimated non-parametric effect of time on 
output into rates of change (or estimates of the growth rate of TFP).  In this case,            is a 
non-parametrically smoothed representation of the annual shifts of the production function, 
estimated from the year dummies.  For arbitrarily small changes in time, the analogy to equation 
(8) is implemented by differentiating            with respect to time: 
(12)                                    
           
    
That is, the slope of            with respect to time provides a point estimate of the instantaneous 
rate of TFP growth.  Taking this derivative at every point of            thus results in a smoothed 
non-parametric path that describes the rate of TFP growth as a continuous function of time. 
  The following section presents estimates of TFP growth rates derived from both the 
SURE and semi-parametric approaches described above. 
6.  Measuring Total Factor Productivity Growth in Agriculture: Results 
  An African success emerges from Figure 4, which presents the rates of TFP growth in 
African crop agriculture, averaged over successive five-year periods from 1961/65 to 2001/06.   29 
 
These results reflect vertical shifts in the successive production functions based on five-year 
averages of annual panel data, estimated by the SURE regression procedure described above.
15  
Thus, for example, the first bar in Figure 4, marked 63-68 describes the average rate of TFP 
growth between "1963" (designating data averaged over the period 1961-65) and "1968" 
(designating data averaged over the period 1966-70).  These baseline results control only for the 
conventional inputs, unadjusted for quality. 
  These preliminary results are encouraging in their reflection of a broad recovery of 
productivity growth in African crop agriculture beginning in the mid-1980s, re-confirming the 
results by Block (1994).  Figure 4 depicts a history in which the early years of independence 
were characterized, on average, by a slow yet positive rate of productivity growth in African 
crop agriculture.  This relatively auspicious start, however, was followed by 15 years of 
stagnation and decline, as TFP growth rates became increasingly negative on average from the 
late 1960s through the early 1980s.  In contrast, TFP growth rates since the mid-1980s, at least in 
this preliminary view, reflect a substantial turnaround, approaching 2.8% per year on average 
between the five-year periods centered around 1998 and 2003.  The challenge, then, is to explain 
this reversal of fortune for African agriculture.  I begin by examining the effect of changes in the 
quality of inputs, in particular land and labor.  First, however, it is useful to review estimates of 
the underlying production function.   
  Table 4 presents estimates of the basic production function for African crop agriculture 
described by equation (7).  The estimates in column (1) include only the conventional inputs.   
                                                            
15 Estimating TFP growth based on vertical shifts of the production function, as noted above, requires equality of the 
production elasticities for given conventional inputs across the production functions for the beginning and ending of 
the period being measured.  Joint tests of the quality of the estimated coefficients on conventional inputs, 
implemented pair-wise for each of the eight sets of adjacent production functions failed to reject the equality of the 
production functions for all but one period (1968-73), and in that case the rejection was only at the .10-level.  These 
tests are thus highly supportive of this SURE approach to TFP estimation. 30 
 
Column (2) adds controls for annual rainfall and the share of land equipped for irrigation to 
adjust for differences in land quality; and column (3) adds average years of schooling to control 
for changes in the quality of labor.  In keeping with the inclusion of country dummies in equation 
(7) to control for, among other things, time-invariant measurement error, the production 
functions in Table 4 are estimated as fixed-effects models. 
  The coefficient estimates in column (1) are all statistically significant and have the 
expected signs.  By comparison with estimates in other studies of African agriculture (such as 
Fuglie, 2010), the production elasticity of land is quite high (and by implication, that of labor, 
quite low).  The higher estimate for land in the present study may reflect in part the exclusion of 
livestock production from the output aggregate (described above).  Historically, much of the 
increase in African crop output has been the result of land extensification.  The implication that a 
10% increase in land area per worker would result in a roughly 8% increase in crop output is thus 
plausible.  Rainfall and share of land equipped for irrigation (which often differs from the share 
of land actually irrigated in any given year due to water constraints), both present significant 
positive effects on per capita output (column (2)).  In addition, column (3) demonstrates the 
significant positive effect of average years of schooling of the labor force on agricultural output, 
suggesting that improvements in the quality of the labor force has been an important positive 
factor for African agriculture. 
  Figure 5 illustrates the non-parametric pattern of TFP growth rates over time, estimated 
from annual data and controlling linearly for (only) the five conventional inputs.  These 
smoothed continuous results are consistent with the initial results presented in Figure 4 in 
suggesting that the stagnation and decline of African crop productivity of the late 1960s through 
the early 1980s has been followed by two decades of substantial recovery and progress.  While 31 
 
that progress appears to have stalled during the early and mid-1990s, average TFP growth rates 
for African crop agriculture have trended steeply upwards since the late 1990s.  By 2005, this 
growth rate exceeded 2% per year.   
  The average TFP growth rate of the path illustrated in Figure 5 is 0.97% per year.  This 
measurement is based on the period 1961 – 2000 for 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  It is not 
adjusted for differences in the quality of inputs.  Over this same period and set of countries, crop 
output grew at the average rate of 1.68% per year.  As a first cut, then, TFP appears to explain 
58% of the growth in Africa’s crop output (though this estimate will be revised downward with 
the incorporation of adjustments for input quality). 
  Is interesting, as well, to disaggregate this average SSA result to the regional level (as 
presented above in Figures 3a-d for the partial productivity analysis).  Here too, Figure 6 
demonstrates substantial heterogeneity across the regions of sub-Saharan Africa, though with a 
trend towards convergence in growth rates.  Southern Africa has maintained a consistently high 
rate of TFP growth throughout this period, though the TFP growth rate for West Africa 
(excluding the Sahel) turned positive around 1975 and surpassed the growth rate for Southern 
Africa between 1980 and 1995.  On the low end, Sahelian and Middle African countries began 
the post-independence period with negative rates of TFP growth, which turned positive only in 
the early and late 1980s, respectively.  These results, summarized in Table 5, are consistent with 
those of the partial productivity analysis presented above.  Comparing, in Table 5, the regional 
average TFP growth rates for the periods 1961-84 and 1985-2002, it is clear that every region 
except East Africa enjoyed a substantially greater rate of TFP growth in the later period. 32 
 
  Returning to the SSA average, the next step is to measure the contributions of changes in 
input quality to these initial estimates of TFP growth.  Figure 7 repeats the semi-parametric 
procedure underlying Figure 5, adjusting first for changes in land quality, and then adjusting for 
labor quality as well.
16  Changes in the quality of land and labor emerge as significant 
contributors to TFP growth.   
  Table 6 quantifies these contributions by calculating the percentage change in the mean 
TFP growth rate over the entire period resulting from the inclusion of these additional 
explanatory variables.  The mean TFP growth rate for the baseline estimates illustrated in Figure 
5 (and in the highest path in Figure 7) for the period 1961 to 2000 was 0.97% per year.
17  After 
adjusting for land quality, this estimate falls to 0.87% per year.  (This difference is significant at 
the .10-level in a one-sided t-test.)  That is, adjustments for land quality explain just over 10% of 
the baseline growth rate of agricultural TFP.   The non-parametric approach reveals that most of 
this difference has occurred since the mid-1980s, reflecting, in part, expansion of irrigation.   
Controlling in addition for improvements in the quality of the agricultural labor force reduces the 
mean TFP residual to 0.59% per year.  Together, adjusting for changes in the quality of land and 
labor inputs thus account for 0.38 percentage points difference in, or 39% of, the baseline growth 
rate of agricultural TFP.   
                                                            
16 Note that the baseline (unadjusted) TFP growth path depicted in Figure 7 is shifted up relative to the baseline 
growth TFP path depicted in Figure 5.  This difference results from the loss of observations, given the availability of 
data for the adjustments to land and labor.  Figures 4 and 5 use the same set of all available observations; whereas 
the three TFP growth paths presented in Figure 7 all use the same, but more limited, sample of observations. 
17 Note that this growth is greater than the unadjusted growth rate reported in Table 5.  This higher rate was 
estimated over a sample that was limited by the availability of data for land and labor quality adjustments, while the 
rate reported in Table 5 was for the largest possible sample. 33 
 
  In terms of the broader growth accounting, this adjusted baseline TFP growth rate 
estimate of 0.59% per year accounts for 36% of the 1.68% per year growth rate of aggregate crop 
output. 
  Even net of these adjustments, however, it is clear from Figure 7 that TFP growth in 
African crop agriculture has generally accelerated since reaching its nadir in the late 1970s.  
Despite a modest deceleration in TFP growth during the early and mid-1990s, aggregate TFP 
growth for African crop agriculture in 2000 was 4 to 5 times greater than it had been 25 years 
earlier. 
  The following section continues the task of decomposing and explaining the TFP residual 
measured here, expanding that task to consider a wider range of potential explanations.  My 
starting point for these additional decompositions is the TFP residual estimated net of 
adjustments for input quality.   
7.  Explanations for Total Factor Productivity Growth in Agriculture 
  This section considers several potential explanations for productivity growth in African 
crop agriculture, including:  expenditures on agricultural research and development, 
infrastructure (roads), the effects of civil war, and incentives (agricultural and macroeconomic 
policy distortions).  Severe data constraints, however, preclude a complete decomposition in 
which all of these potential explanations are considered together.  The best one can do, then, is to 
compare the baseline TFP residual (net of adjustments for input quality) individually against 
each of these potential explanations.  In each case, it is necessary to re-estimate the "baseline" 
TFP growth rate based on the sample of observations available for each potential explanation of 
productivity growth.  This approach provides estimates of the share of TFP growth explained by 34 
 
each of these factors; yet, these results will not be strictly additive across the potential 
explanations (as the explanatory variables are not orthogonal to one another), and the 
generalizability of these results must be qualified (as each decomposition must be estimated over 
a slightly different sub-sample of the full data set).  It may be reasonable, then, to think of the 
following results as reflecting upper-bounds on the role of any individual explanation for 
productivity growth. 
  As in my previous accounting for input quality adjustments, my approach to measuring 
the contribution of a given explanatory variable to TFP growth is first to estimate the quality-
adjusted production function with and without the additional variable, and then to calculate the 
percentage difference in the means of the resulting non-parametric TFP growth paths as the 
contribution of that variable to TFP growth. 
Agricultural R&D 
  Ultimately, measured productivity growth is intended to reflect a deeper process of 
technological change.  Expenditures on agricultural R&D are thus a potentially important driver 
of productivity growth, as numerous studies have shown for Africa and for other developing and 
developed regions (most recently for Africa, Alene, 2010).  Data on agricultural research 
expenditures for 27 sub-Saharan African countries since 1971 have been collected by the 
Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) Initiative, housed at the International 
Food Policy Research Institute.
18  Beintema and Stads (2006) describe the rapid post-
independence growth in funding for agricultural R&D in Africa, followed by slower growth in 
research expenditures during the 1980s, and near stagnation during 1990s.  Table 7, from 
                                                            
18 The ASTI data are available for download at http://www.asti.cgiar.org/data/. 35 
 
Beintema and Stads (2006, p. 4), disaggregates agricultural R&D expenditures in Africa by 
region and decade.  By region, the average growth rate of R&D expenditures from 1971 to 2000 
has been greatest in East Africa -- exceeding the growth rate of expenditures in West Africa by a 
factor of nearly eight.  These are annual expenditures by governments in each country. They thus 
reflect a flow of inputs into R&D.  While much of the national funding for agricultural R&D in 
Africa is donor-funded, these data do not include the benefits for any given country of 
expenditures by the international agricultural research centers.  Thus, to the extent that national 
funding and the benefits of international research are correlated, the present estimates may be 
biased upwards. 
  Substantial lags exist between the time expenditures on R&D occur and the time they 
affect productivity.  Alene (2010) examines alternative lag structures on R&D expenditures, with 
lags ranging from 2 to 16 years.  His finding that the maximum effect of agricultural R&D 
occurs around lag 10 leads him to conclude that the slowdown in agricultural TFP growth during 
the 1990s is partially explained by the reduced growth rate of agricultural R&D expenditures in 
the 1980s.  This is consistent with the prediction by Block (1995), which also found that 
agricultural research expenditures, lagged by ten years, were significant in explaining the 
recovery of African agricultural productivity during the 1980s (but which expressed concern for 
the future impact of reduced R&D expenditures by the late 1980s). 
  Adding the 10-year lag of log agricultural R&D expenditures to the production function 
estimated above (net of input quality adjustments) results in a production elasticity of 
approximately 0.2 (P = 0.000), suggesting that doubling the level of agricultural R&D 
expenditures at time t would boost agricultural output per worker by 20% at time t+10 -- a 
substantial effect, and one that is consistent with studies that find high rates of return to 36 
 
agricultural research expenditures in Africa (Alene, 2010).
19   Including the 10-year lag of R&D 
expenditures limits the estimation period to1981-2000.  For that period, the 10-year lag of R&D 
expenditures explains 75% of estimated TFP growth.  Extending the estimation period back to 
1976-2000 by including only the 5-year lag of R&D expenditures results in only a small 
reduction in the estimated production elasticity (to 0.18).  In this case, agricultural R&D 
expenditures still explain 45% of estimated TFP growth. 
Roads 
  The potential benefits of increased road density for agricultural productivity have been 
explored in a variety of developing-country settings.   These benefits, according to Zhang and 
Fan (2004) include:  increased profitability of farming resulting from reduced transportation 
costs; greater purchases of inputs and marketing of output resulting from reduced transportation 
costs; and, the potential to shift land from low-value cereals to higher-value horticulture with 
reduced risks of perishability.  Zhang and Fan (2004) demonstrate significant contributions of 
roads to crop TFP in rural India, as do Mendes, Teixeira, and Salvato (2009) for Brazil, and 
Suphannachart and Warr (2009) for Thailand, among many others.  In a simulation model of 
Uganda, Gollin and Rogerson (2010) also find significant complementarities between road 
density and agricultural TFP.  Most recently, Dorosh, et. al. (2010) provide evidence from sub-
Saharan Africa that agricultural production is higher in areas with lower travel times to urban 
markets, and that adoption of modern technologies is negatively correlated with travel time to 
urban centers. 
                                                            
19 Including R&D expenditures in the production function required excluding the country dummies, as virtually all 
of the variation in R&D expenditure is in the cross-section dimension of the data (rendering the “within” estimator 
impractical). 37 
 
  Such findings are consistent with both intuition and with the broadly held presumption 
that roads are a critical ingredient for growth in agricultural productivity in Africa.  For instance, 
in its Framework for African Agricultural Productivity, the Comprehensive African Agriculture 
Development Program (2006, p. 16) presents it as a given that, "... investment in infrastructure, 
particularly rural feeder roads, can also lead to large productivity growth and poverty reduction 
efforts."  It is difficult, however, to demonstrate this contribution with available cross-country 
country data. 
  To account for the potential contributions of roads to agricultural TFP in Africa, I re-
estimate my baseline semi-parametric production function to include countries' share of paved 
roads as a proportion of total roads.  These roads data, drawn from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators, are quite limited in their country coverage and only begin in 1990.  The 
median paved road share for 1990-2007 was 16%.  Perhaps owing to either the small sample size 
or to the general lack of paved roads, the estimated production elasticity for paved road share is 
effectively zero, and its inclusion makes virtually no difference to the estimated rate of TFP 
growth.  Replacing the paved road share of total roads with the ratio of road kilometers to arable 
land does not change this result.  One cannot conclude from this that the broad intuition 
regarding roads' potential contribution to agricultural TFP is wrong.  Rather, available cross-
country data and historical experience in Africa do not yet provide the expected statistical 
support for that intuition. 
Civil War 
  Civil conflict has been endemic in much of sub-Saharan Africa in the post-independence 
period.  Sambanis and Elbadawi (2000) report that between 1960 and 2000, 40% of sub-Saharan 38 
 
African countries had experienced at least one period of civil war, and that in the year 2000 alone 
20% of sub-Saharan Africa's population lived in countries that were formally at war (with 
endemic low-intensity conflict in any other countries).  They attributed this problem to high 
levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural resources.  It 
is reasonable to suppose that endemic civil war (and perhaps even the expectation of civil war) 
could negatively affect agricultural productivity.  Physical destruction of crops, damaged 
infrastructure inhibiting both the purchase of inputs and the marketing of outputs, the diversion 
and destruction of human capital, and the potential reticence of households to invest in 
agricultural improvement given the threat of these disruptions, could all lead to reductions in 
agricultural productivity.  I test this hypothesis by including in the production function data on 
the incidence of civil wars, carefully constructed by Sambanis (2006).
20 
  A dummy variable equal to one during years of civil war enters the production function 
negatively, with a coefficient equal to -.04 (P = 0.11), suggesting that average crop output across 
the sample falls by 4% during years of civil war.  Its effect on productivity is greater.  
Comparing the averages of the non-parametric TFP growth paths with and without the incidence 
of civil wars suggest that average TFP growth in African crop agriculture for the period 1960 to 
2000 would have been over 11% greater in the absence of civil wars.  This is the average effect 
based on the occurrence of civil war in 13% of the country-year observations included in the 
regression.  A cautious interpretation of this result might consider the possibility that the 
incidence of civil war acts as a proxy for broader (and excluded) institutional failures. 
  Given this qualification, one can gain additional insight into the effect of civil war on 
agricultural productivity in Africa by dividing the sample into observations with and without 
                                                            
20 I am grateful to Nicholas Sambanis and to Robert Bates for making these civil war data available. 39 
 
civil war, observing their distinct experiences over time as opposed to the average effect of civil 
war across the entire sample.  This approach reveals that the average rate of agricultural TFP 
growth was 0.74 percentage points lower (and negative on average) in the presence of civil war.  
Figure 8 illustrates these differences, which (given the inclusion of country fixed effects) are 
identified by countries moving in or out of the state of civil war.
21 
Macroeconomic Policy Distortions (Black Market Premium) 
  It is well-documented that African economies have historically experienced high degrees 
of distortion in macroeconomic policy.  It has also been documented, first by Krueger, Schiff, 
and Valdes (1988), that macroeconomic distortions in developing countries have often imposed 
indirect taxes on agricultural producers in excess of their rates of direct taxation.  That story 
highlighted the role of real exchange rates, which were often overvalued to the detriment of 
African farmers (who tended to produce import-competing tradables or exportables).  By 
undermining agricultural incentives, macroeconomic policy distortions might also have affected 
agricultural productivity.  To test that hypothesis, I use data on the black market premium for 
foreign currency, often employed as a proxy for such distortions.  Over the period 1961-2004, 
the mean black market premium for sub-Saharan Africa was approximately 66% (though this 
mean falls to 30% if one excludes as outliers observations with black market premia greater than 
500%). 
  The estimated coefficient on the log black market premium in the production function is 
not statistically different from zero, indicating that this proxy for macroeconomic distortions did 
                                                            
21 It is possible that this over-estimates the difference between settings with and without civil war if TFP is under-
estimated during civil wars. This could be the case if the data simply count the number of workers in the sector, 
some of whom are prevented from working by war.  The author is grateful to Keith Fuglie for noting this. 40 
 
not affect crop output, per se.
22  Yet, including the log black market premium in the specification 
accounts for 29% of measured TFP growth.  Figure 9 illustrates this result.  It is interesting to 
note that the productivity cost of this macroeconomic distortion diminishes over time relative to 
the baseline TFP growth path, given that black-market currency premia in Africa over this period 
fell on average by 12% per year (and was half the level post-1990 that had pertained pre-1990). 
Agricultural Policy Distortions (Relative Rate of Assistance) 
  Producer incentives might also exert a substantial effect on agricultural productivity, 
particularly as regards farmers' choices on production intensity, crop mix, and input use.  In a 
recent and major update to the earlier work by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988), the World 
Bank has released an extensive data set on trade-based agricultural price distortions (Anderson 
and Valenzuela, 2008).  This data set provides commodity-specific indicators of the policy-
induced divergence between domestic and international prices, covering 30 different 
commodities in 68 countries (including 13 countries from sub-Saharan Africa) since 1955.  The 
key analytical building block of this data set is the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) for each 
commodity-year observation, essentially measuring the rate of tax or subsidy at the border.  
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) also aggregate these nominal rates of assistance into 
agricultural and non-agricultural categories.  By calculating the ratio of the rate of assistance to 
agricultural versus non-agricultural commodities, they create a relative rate of assistance (RRA) 
indicator, which measures the extent to which agriculture is either favored or disfavored by trade 
policy.
23  Historically, African governments have discriminated heavily against their agricultural 
sectors (Bates, 1981).  This discrimination peaked around 1980, and though reduced during the 
                                                            
22 This regression excludes outliers on black-market premia (over 500%). 
23 An RRA less than zero indicates relative discrimination against agriculture; an RRA greater than zero indicates a 
relative discrimination in favor of agriculture. 41 
 
subsequent years of structural adjustment, was still present in 2005 (Masters and Garcia, 2010; 
Bates and Block, 2010). 
  Figure 10 juxtaposes the TFP growth paths (with and without controlling for RRA) with 
the nonparametric time path of the RRA, itself.  The similarity of these patterns is striking.  The 
RRA is negative throughout this period.  The fact that TFP growth rates and the RRA decline 
and then rise together suggests the possibility that it is the first-difference (rather than the level) 
of the RRA that drives TFP growth.  With this motivation, I include the first-difference of RRA 
in the semi-parametric production function.  The RRA, however, is a policy choice and thus 
potentially vulnerable to reverse causation.  This would require that governments choose to 
discriminate more heavily against sectors that perform worse over time, and discriminate less 
heavily against sectors as their performance improves.  Such a perspective runs contrary to the 
logic found in much of the political economy literature on this subject (Bates, 1981), and ignores 
the external pressures for reform that characterized much of the 1980s and 1990s in Africa.  
Nonetheless, to provide at least some degree of protection against the potential for reverse 
causation, I specify the production function to include the lagged first-difference of the RRA.  
The point estimate (as expected) is positive, yet not statistically different from zero (0.037, P = 
.62).   
  The effect of RRA on TFP growth, however, is statistically significant (P = .016), as the 
lagged first-difference of RRA explains 16% of TFP growth over this period (as illustrated in 
Figure 10).
24, 25   
                                                            
24 Headey, Alauddin, and Prasada Rao (2010) find positive contributions to agricultural TFP growth with the same 
RRA indicator in a broader sample of mostly non-African developing countries.  This is consistent, as well, with 
earlier evidence based on the use of the nominal protection coefficient in a small sample of non-African developing 
countries by Fulginiti and Perrin (1999). 42 
 
  Table 8 summarizes the results described in this section.  This list of potential 
explanations for agricultural productivity growth in Africa is far from comprehensive, yet it 
represents the broad categories that have been addressed in the literature.  Ideally, one would 
incorporate all of these potential explanations into a single decomposition.  In practice, data 
constraints preclude such a comprehensive approach, requiring instead the pair-wise 
comparisons presented above.  I take at least a small step towards that ideal by estimating the 
contributions of each potential explanation for productivity growth against baseline estimates 
that are adjusted for variations in the quality of land and labor.  Nonetheless, this approach 
supports only broad statements regarding the relative importance of various explanations for 
productivity growth.  As Table 8 reflects, expenditures on agricultural R&D, albeit with 
substantial lags, play the largest role in explaining agricultural TFP growth.  Policy distortions, 
both at the macroeconomic and sectoral level, have also played an important, though smaller, 
role.  Africa's agricultural TFP growth, on average, would have been 11% faster in the absence 
of civil wars (though the difference is much greater in the specific comparison of country-year 
observations with and without civil wars).  And, contrary to expectations, available data suggest 
that infrastructure as represented by paved roads has contributed little to Africa's agricultural 
TFP growth. 
  Ghana, in many ways, reflects the experience of sub-Saharan Africa over this period.  
The following section draws on the broader cross-country analysis to highlight key aspects and 
determinants of Ghana’s agricultural productivity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
25 The black market premium and the first difference of the RRA are only loosely correlated (ρ = -0.11).  While this 
negative correlation suggests that countries with distorted currency regimes also tended to discriminate against 
agriculture, the small magnitude of this correlation suggests that these two indicators do indeed reflect different 
impacts on agricultural productivity. 43 
 
8.  The Case of Ghana 
  This brief review is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of Ghana’s agricultural 
productivity experience.  Rather, the primary objective is to explore in greater detail key findings 
from the cross-country analysis regarding the drivers of productivity growth.  A secondary 
objective of this brief review of Ghana is to highlight some the issues that arise in country-level 
analysis – issues that are generally invisible at the cross-country level, but which may suggest 
caution in interpreting of cross-country findings. 
Partial & Total Factor Productivity in Ghana 
  Ghana typifies the decline and rise pattern of agricultural productivity seen in the broader 
African sample.  Figure 11 summarizes Ghana’s experience as reflected in the time path of its 
partial productivity ratios.  The first decade of independence saw small gains in crop yield 
combined with declining output per worker.  The country’s decline into economic chaos during 
the 1970s is reflected in the rapid deterioration of both land and labor productivity depicted in 
Figure 11.  For agriculture, the country’s economic nadir in 1983 was exacerbated by severe 
drought (starting in 1981), widespread bushfires, and the forced repatriation of one million 
Ghanaians from Nigeria.   
  These negative trends were strikingly reversed in the early 1980s, leading to a sustained 
(and continuing) period of growth in the productivity of both land and labor.  Clearly, looking 
only at a path connecting the first and last periods (from which we would conclude that the 
annual growth rates of average land and labor productivity were 1.35% and 0.6%, respectively) 
would obscure the dramatic decline and resurgence seen by tracing out successive 5-year period 
averages. The narrative of Ghana’s agricultural productivity is thus much more complex than 44 
 
would be implied by the moderate rates of growth in land and labor productivity observed on 
average over the period 1961 – 2007.  The challenge is to explain the decline and rise. 
  The semi-parametric estimation approach developed above is not well-applied to a single 
country time series of only 40 observations.  The estimated (input quality-adjusted) production 
elasticities are not statistically significant.  Yet, controlling linearly for the conventional inputs 
results in a TFP growth path, depicted in Figure 12, which is statistically different from zero and 
suggests an average rate of crop TFP growth of 1.03% per year from 1961 – 2000.  This pattern 
of TFP growth rates is also consistent with the pattern of partial productivity ratios for Ghana 
shown in Figure 11.   
  For the period 1961 – 2000, aggregate crop output in Ghana grew at the average annual 
rate of 2.37%.  Growth accounting thus suggests that a TFP growth rate of 1.03% accounts for 
approximately 43% of the growth in crop output. 
  One way to summarize the current levels of crop productivity is to compare current yields 
against potential yields.  Such analysis by Ghana’s Ministry of Agriculture (2007) suggests that 
the yields gaps remain substantial.  For example, average maize yield of 1.5 MT/Ha is reported 
to be 40% short of the achievable yield.  Yield gaps calculated for other staple grains are 
reported on the same order of magnitude, while the yield gap for cassava in Ghana is reported to 
be 57.5% (Breisinger, et. al., 2008).  The challenge is to identify the constraints to reducing these 
yield gaps.   
  One critical constraint to reducing the yield gap is the great heterogeneity of conditions 
that characterize agriculture in Ghana (and virtually every other country in sub-Saharan Africa).  
Figure 13 shows that Ghanaian agriculture is spread across six distinct agro-ecological zones, 45 
 
each listed here with its mean annual rainfall in millimeters:  Rain Forest (2,200), Deciduous 
Forest (1,500), Transitional (1,300), Coastal (800), Guinea Savanna (1,100), and Sudan Savanna 
(1,000).  These zones differ in their average annual rainfall by a factor of nearly four (Figure 14); 
unlike the first four zones, which have two growing seasons, the two Savanna zones have only 
one.  Ghana’s agro-ecological zones also differ in their soil types and in the length of their 
growing seasons, as a result of which they also differ widely in the mix of crops produced.  In 
addition, the productivity levels and growth rates for individual crops also vary widely across 
agro-ecological zones.   
  Figures 15 (a – d) illustrate this diversity for maize, cassava, sorghum, and plantains.  
Maize is grown widely across Ghana, yet maize yields also vary widely across agro-ecological 
zones.  The greatest concentration of relatively high-yield maize production is in the southern 
Guinea savanna in transitional zones, while the greatest concentration of relatively low-yield 
maize production lies just south of there in the forest zone.  Average yields in the former are 
approximately twice those of the latter.  Cassava production is similarly widespread (with the 
exception of the northernmost savanna areas), with a spatial distribution of yields similar to that 
of maize.  In contrast, sorghum is grown exclusively in the Guinea and Sudan savanna zones, 
and districts with vastly different yields border one another; while plantain is grown exclusively 
in the forest and coastal zones, with somewhat less spatial variation in yields.   
R&D 
  The cross-country analysis identified expenditure on agricultural R&D as a key 
determinant of productivity growth.  The diversity of agricultural conditions within Ghana 
multiplies the technical challenges to increasing agricultural productivity.  Broadly, however, the 46 
 
relationship between R&D expenditures and TFP growth in Ghana is consistent with the cross-
country evidence.   
  While the poor estimation of the underlying production function renders the estimated 
TFP growth rates for Ghana as merely suggestive, their conformity with a 10-year lag of 
expenditures on agricultural R&D is striking.
26  Figure 12 juxtaposes the growth path of crop 
TFP with R&D expenditures.  The transition to positive rates of TFP growth in the early 1980s 
follows by roughly 10 years the increased expenditures on agricultural R&D of the early 1970s; 
the peak in TFP growth rates seen in the mid-1990s similarly follows the peak of R&D 
expenditures of the mid-1980s; and, the decline in TFP growth rates in the late 1990s also lags 
by approximately 10 years the reduced R&D expenditures of the late 1980s.  The main anomaly 
to this pattern is that the reduced expenditures of the late 1970s and early 1980s are not reflected 
in the estimated TFP growth path. 
  R&D expenditure is a blunt proxy for specific research outputs.  The main research 
output of interest here is improved varieties of staple grains.  As Figure 15a demonstrates, maize 
is grown is all of Ghana’s agro-ecological zones.  The diversity of growing conditions, however, 
implies that improved maize varieties must be adapted to specific settings.  Ghana’s Crop 
Research Institute takes the lead in developing and releasing improved varieties.  During the 
critical period of reversal in crop productivity trends, the Crop Research Institute, in 
collaboration with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) implemented the Ghana Grains Development Project.  Between 
                                                            
26 The TFP growth path for Ghana is not statistically different from zero when lagged R&D expenditures are 
included in the production function (though the sample falls to 19 years). 47 
 
1984 and 1996, this project developed and released twelve improved varieties of maize (Morris, 
Tripp, and Dankyi, 1999).  The project also promoted use of chemical fertilizers to complement 
these improved varieties, and recommended new planting strategies. 
  While these research advances created the potential for improved maize productivity, the 
real benefits came only with their widespread adoption.  By 1997, a nation-wide survey found 
that 54% of farmers planted modern varieties of maize, though adoption rates varied widely 
across agro-ecological zones (the highest adoption rate, 69%, was in the coastal savanna, while 
the lowest rate, 38%, was in the Forest zone).  Adoption of recommended planting strategies 
followed a similar pattern.  Yet, only 21% of farmers adopted the recommended fertilizers 
(ranging from 36% in the Guinea Savanna to 9% in the Forest zone), and only 26% of the 
national maize crop (by area) received fertilizer.   (Morris, Tripp, and Dankyi, 1999.)  In 1997, 
approximately half of Ghana’s maize area was planted to modern varieties (ranging from 75% in 
the Coastal Savanna, to 33% in the Forest).
27 
  Adoption of improved maize was thus reasonably widespread, if unevenly so, across the 
country.  On the supply side, one constraint to more widespread adoption of improved maize 
varieties was an inability of the Ghana Seed Company (a government entity) to multiply the 
improved seeds in sufficient quantity (Morris, et. al., 1999).  On the demand side, Doss and 
Morris (2001) found that the key constraints to adoption were lack of access to land, labor, and 
credit.  Jatoe, Al-Hassan, and Abatania (2005) found similar constraints to the adoption of 
improved sorghum varieties in northern Ghana, where 40% of farmers had adopted improved 
sorghum, but only 0.1% of total sorghum area was planted to modern varieties.   
                                                            
27 The survey also found that 9% of farmers who adopted modern varieties subsequently “disadopted” them, along 
with nearly one-third of those who had tried fertilizer, and 13% of those who had adopted recommended 
management techniques. 48 
 
  More recently, Kwadzo, Ansah, Kuwornu, and Amegashie (2010) surveyed farmers in 
Ghana’s Eastern Region.  They found that 83% of farmers had adopted improved maize, which 
covered 78% of maize area planted in the region.  Yet, they also found that the yield potential of 
this adoption was not maximized because only 34% of farmers had also adopted nitrogen 
fertilizer, and that only 30% of maize area received fertilizer.  They also found that the likelihood 
of adoption of improved maize was a positive function of both road access by farmers and the 
number of visits by extension agents. 
Policy Interventions 
  Policy interventions – both macroeconomic and sectoral – were also found to play 
important roles in shaping agricultural productivity patterns in the African cross-section.  In this 
regard, too, Ghana is representative.   
  Ghana’s post-independence economic and policy experience is divided into two distinct 
periods.  Following its auspicious emergence into independence in 1957 as an essentially middle-
income country, Ghana’s economy spiraled gradually downward into chaos, reaching its nadir in 
the crisis of 1983.  With the adoption of its well-known Economic Recovery Program in that 
year, the country entered an extended (and continuing) period of stable growth.  The 
macroeconomic environment that ended in crisis was characterized by high inflation, large fiscal 
deficits, declining exports, and a black market premium on its currency that grew from 35% in 
the early 1970s to 367% in the late 1970s, to nearly 1300% in the early 1980s (World Bank data 
cited in Brooks, Croppenstedt, and Aggrey-Fynn, 2009).   
  This history coincides cleanly with the sharp reversal of the partial productivity path 
depicted in Figure 11, as well as with the transition to positive rates of TFP growth depicted in 49 
 
Figure 15.  The potential connections between macroeconomic distortions and agricultural 
productivity are direct.  The dramatically overvalued exchange rates that characterized the late 
1970s and early 1980s in Ghana directly undermined incentives for domestic producers of 
import-competing crops (such as maize and rice), as well as for export-crop producers (cocoa).  
The 90% real depreciation of the cedi between 1983 and 1987 helped to relieve prior 
macroeconomic discrimination against agriculture, improving incentive on the output side, yet 
also increasing the cost of imported inputs.  In addition, economic reform included the 
elimination of numerous input subsidies that had contributed to the unsustainable fiscal deficits.  
Thus, for example, the removal of fertilizer subsidies in 1990 led to a 36% increase in the real 
price of fertilizer, while the prices of insecticides and fungicides tripled in real terms with the 
removal of their subsidies (Seini, 2002). 
  Policy reforms at the sectoral level were less ambiguous in their benefits for Ghana’s 
farmers.  The period from independence to 1983 was characterized by high rates of agricultural 
taxation – both indirect (arising largely from the overvalued exchange rate), and direct.  
Subsequent to the liberalization of Ghana’s foreign exchange market and the devaluation of the 
cedi in 1984, agricultural taxation was primarily direct taxation.  The example of cocoa taxation  
is notorious.  The combination of an overvalued exchange rate and direct taxation in the form of 
low producer prices paid by the monopsonistic Ghana Cocoa Board was such that by 1983, 
farmers received about one-fifth of the FOB price of cocoa (Seini, 2002).  With the subsequent 
devaluation and the reform of agricultural policies that accompanied the Economic Reform 
Program, cocoa farmers’ share of the FOB price had increased to 40% by 1995, and to 50% by 
2001 (Brooks, Croppenstedt, and Aggrey-Fynn, 2009).   50 
 
  The nominal and relative rates of assistance (described above) provide a more general 
indicator of agricultural policy in Ghana.  Average rates of taxation (measured relative to 
international prices) for agricultural tradables increased from approximately 17% in the early 
1960s to 50% by the late 1970s.  With the period of reform, these rates of taxation fell back to 
17% by the late 1980s, and averaged just over 3% for 2000-04 (Brooks, Croppenstedt, and 
Aggrey-Fynn, 2009).  Comparing this indicator to similar measures for non-agriculture provides 
an indicator of price discrimination of agriculture relative to non-agriculture (the “relative rate of 
assistance”).  From this broader perspective, as well, one finds substantial and increasing 
discrimination against agriculture in the pre-reform period, with declining but persistent 
discrimination against agriculture in the post-reform period.  Relative discrimination against 
agriculture averaged just over 6% in the early 1960s, increasing to approximately 25% in the late 
1970s.  While falling substantially during the period of economic reform, this indicator of 
relative discrimination was still 8% for 2000-04.   
  Figure 16 highlights the close association between the TFP growth path for Ghana’s crop 
agriculture with the (non-parametrically smoothed) path of the relative rate of assistance for 
agriculture versus non-agriculture in Ghana.  As in the broader cross-section, the RRA remains 
negative throughout the period (indicating relative discrimination against agriculture); yet, it is 
clear from Figure 16 that reductions in this rate of discrimination were associated with increases 
in the rate of TFP growth.  The potential for this association to be explained by reverse 
causation, in which improved TFP growth led to reduced discrimination against agriculture, is 
strongly limited by the fact that the severity of Ghana’s economic crisis (and its multiple sectoral 
and macroeconomic adjustment agreements with the IMF and World Bank) left the government 
no choice but to implement its broad program of economic reforms. 51 
 
  This brief review demonstrates that agricultural productivity growth in Ghana broadly 
reflects the cross-country experience of sub-Saharan Africa.  The general pattern of post-
independence decline followed by renewed productivity growth since the 1980s is clear in 
Ghana.  The important roles of agricultural R&D expenditure and policy interventions seen in 
the broader cross-section are also clear in Ghana. 
Cautionary Note 
  Even a brief country case study can serve the purpose of providing a cautionary note for 
the interpretation of cross-country findings.  In particular, Ghana’s agro-ecological diversity is 
common in sub-Saharan Africa.  From a technological perspective, this diversity greatly 
complicates current efforts to promote a new green revolution for Africa.  As seen in Figure 14(a 
– d), different crops are specific to different agro-ecological zones; and for ubiquitous crops such 
as maize, an improved variety that thrives in humid Evergreen zones of south-western Ghana 
may be inappropriate for planting in the arid zones of the northern savanna.  An analysis that 
explains aggregate agricultural productivity at the country level based on total expenditures on 
agricultural R&D inevitably obscures the fact that both expenditures and productivity growth are 
likely to be quite unevenly distributed across the country.
28  This diversity is even more obscured 
when that aggregate country-level analysis is merely part of a broader cross-country panel data 
set. 
  Looking within a particular country also enables a closer examination of the sources and 
quality of agricultural data.  In the case of Ghana, Obirih-Opareh (2004) provides a critical 
examination of the methods applied by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in compiling its 
                                                            
28 Indeed, regional disparities between Ghana’s northern and southern zones are a source of considerable tension. 52 
 
national area and production data.  He notes, for example, that most Ghanaian farmers do not 
keep their own records of area and production.  In addition, Obirih-Opareh notes that most 
farmers mix numerous crops in a single field, further complicating the calculation of area and 
yield of individual crops, and that many farms are not accessible by road.  As a result, production 
and area surveys must rely on limited and potentially poorly-measured samples.  For export 
crops, such as cocoa, the situation is better.  Similarly, consumption data for imported inputs 
such as chemical fertilizer, are also more reliable.  Yet, Obirih-Opareh in general finds that the 
limited ability of the Government to undertake annual nation-wide surveys of complex and 
remote production systems often leads to statistical anomalies in the published data.  He also 
notes that different international and national sources of published data on agricultural area and 
production in Ghana provide conflicting information.  In this respect, too, Ghana is undoubtedly 
not unique in sub-Saharan Africa. 
9.  Conclusions 
  Agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa has been a qualified success.  
Total factor productivity growth has increased rapidly since the early 1980s.  By the early 2000s, 
average annual TFP growth was roughly four times faster than it had been 25 years earlier.  This 
period of accelerated growth, however, followed nearly 20 years of declining rates of TFP 
growth subsequent to independence in the early 1960s.  Average agricultural TFP growth for 
sub-Saharan Africa was 0.14% per year during 1960 – 84, and increased to 1.24% per year from 
1985 – 2002.  The average over this period was approximately 0.6% per year, which accounts for 
36% of the increase in total crop output over this period. 
  These highly aggregated results conceal substantial regional and country-level variation.  
While regional TFP growth rates have tended to converge over time, and most rapid rate of TFP 53 
 
agricultural growth over the entire period 1960 – 2002 was in Southern Africa (1.25% per year), 
while the slowest rate was in the Sahel (-1.17%).  With the exception of East Africa, every 
region’s TFP growth rate was higher between the years1985 – 2002 than it had been during 1960 
– 1984.   
  From among the long list of potential explanations for these trends, this paper considers 
several leading contenders.  Data constraints on individual explanations preclude a unified and 
comprehensive decomposition of the productivity residual.  It is clear, however, that 
expenditures on agricultural R&D, along with the reform of macroeconomic and sectoral policies 
shaping agricultural incentives have played a substantial role in explaining both the decline and 
the rise in agricultural productivity found in this paper.   
  The case study of Ghana clearly reflects these broader findings, and permits a more 
nuanced view of their effects.  The case study also provides a brief window into the vast 
complexity of agricultural development in any single country, and in doing so, provides a 
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Figure 15 (a – d).  Yield, by District, for Maize, Cassava, Sorghum, and Plantain (2008) 
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Table 1.  Partial Productivity Ratio Growth Rates by Region 
Region 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-07 1961-2007 
East 
    Output/Worker  1.06  -0.73  1.3  -0.03  1.16  0.26 
    Output/Ha  1.81  1.22  2.56  1.38  1.16  1.59 
    Ha/Worker  -0.75  -1.95 -1.26  -1.41  0  -1.33 
Central 
    Output/Worker  0.97  -0.76  -0.58  1.2  1.67  -0.09 
    Output/Ha  0.55  -1.43  1.09  2.3  2.19  0.65 
    Ha/Worker  0.42  0.67  -1.67 -1.1  -0.52 -0.74 
Southern 
    Output/Worker  3.14  1.98  3.72  2.68  1.09  1.24 
    Output/Ha  3  1.87  3.32  3.39  1.74  1.14 
    Ha/Worker  0.14  0.11  0.4  -0.71  -0.65  0.1 
Western 
    Output/Worker  0.4  1.31  3.16  2.77  4.67  1.05 
    Output/Ha  1.14  1.46  3.61  2.14  2.69  1.27 
    Ha/Worker  -0.74  -0.15  -0.45  0.63  1.98  -0.22 
Sahel 
    Output/Worker  -0.99  -0.95  1.92  0.96  2.34  -0.05 
    Output/Ha  0.38  0.24  0.23  0.42  1.71  0.56 
    Ha/Worker  -1.37  -1.19  1.69  0.54  0.63  -0.61 
SSA 
    Output/Worker  0.81  -0.02  1.79  1.12  2.18  0.41 
    Output/Ha  1.38  0.78  1.79  1.79  1.65  1.24 
    Ha/Worker  -0.57  -0.8 0 -0.67  0.53  -0.83 
Source: FAO and author’s calculations 
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Table 2.  Growth Rates of Partial Productivity Ratios by Country 
1961 - 2007  Growth Rate of:  Ranked by: 
Output/Worker Output/Ha Output/Worker Output/Ha 
Angola            -0.98  1.25  Nigeria  Nigeria 
Benin 3.03  2.09  Benin  Seychelles 
Botswana -.625  1.52  Gabon  Swaziland 
Burkina Faso  1.74  1.65  Swaziland  Malawi 
Burundi -0.47  0.79  South  Africa  Zambia 
Cameroon 1.09  1.81  Seychelles  Namibia 
Cape Verde  1.91  1.51  Cape Verde  Ethiopia 
Cent Afr Rep  -.107  0.684  Côte d'Ivoire  Kenya 
Chad 0.35  1.43  Namibia  Benin 
Comoros -0.62  0.803  Burkina  Faso  Niger 
Congo -0.29  1.19  Mali  Côte  d'Ivoire 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -0.63  1.15  Malawi  Cameroon 
Côte d'Ivoire  1.88  1.82  Mauritania  Tanzania 
Djibouti 6.17  10.61  Cameroon  Burkina  Faso 
Equatorial Guinea  -2.75  -2.01  Mauritius  Botswana 
Eritrea -3.99  -3.78  Guinea  Cape  Verde 
Ethiopia -0.18  2.25  Sierra  Leone  Chad 
Gabon 3.02  0.47  Ghana  Ghana 
Gambia  -2.86  -2.09  Rwanda  Angola           
Ghana 0.6  1.41  Zambia Rwanda 
Guinea 0.78  0.81  Chad  Congo 
Guinea-Bissau -0.65  -0.44  Tanzania  Congo,  Dem.  Rep. 
Kenya 0.15  2.17  Kenya  Lesotho 
Lesotho  -0.54  1.12  Central African Rep  Togo 
Liberia -0.79  0.9  Mozambique  South  Africa 
Madagascar -0.41  0.62  Ethiopia  Liberia 
Malawi 1.46  2.62  Congo  Uganda 
Mali 1.73  0.67  Togo  Guinea 
Mauritania 1.12  0.17  Madagascar  Comoros 
Mauritius 1.06  -0.09  Burundi  Burundi 
Mozambique  -0.15  0.2  Uganda  Central African Republic 
Namibia 1.87  2.39  Niger  Mali 
Niger -0.52  1.87  Lesotho  Madagascar 
Nigeria 3.43  3.16  Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
Rwanda 0.56  1.19  Comoros  Gabon 
Senegal -1.93  0.33  Botswana  Sierra  Leone 
Seychelles 2.54  2.78  Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  Senegal 
Sierra Leone  0.65  0.42  Guinea-Bissau  Mozambique 82 
 
Somalia -1.1  -0.02  Liberia  Mauritania 
South Africa  2.6  1.01  Angola            Somalia 
Swaziland 2.91  2.63  Somalia  Mauritius 
Tanzania 0.28  1.73  Senegal  Guinea-Bissau 
Togo  -0.35  1.05  Equatorial Guinea  Equatorial Guinea 
Uganda -0.48  0.83  Gambia  Gambia 
Zambia 0.36  2.46  Eritrea  Eritrea 
Zimbabwe  -0.6  0.48  (excluding Djibouti, as too small and an outlier) 
AVERAGE 0.441  1.21 
    (excl. Djibouti) 
Source:  FAO and author’s calculations 
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Table 3.  Annual Growth Rates of Crop Output and Conventional Inputs 
 1961-84  1985-2007  1961-2007 
Crop  Output  1.66 2.22 2.09 
Labor  1.60 1.64 1.63 
Land  0.84 0.90 0.85 
Livestock  2.28 1.67 1.88 
Tractors 7.14  -0.5  3.47 
Fertilizer 6.28  -0.5  3.35 





Table 4.  Production Function Estimates (with Country Fixed Effects), 1961 – 2000.  Dependent 
variable: aggregate crop output 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Log land per worker  0.821***  0.822***  0.923*** 
 (17.07)  (17.22)  (18.12) 
Log tractors per worker  0.025*  0.028**  0.031** 
  (1.81) (2.08) (2.34) 
Log livestock per worker  0.149***  0.106***  0.009 
  (3.96) (2.90) (0.22) 
Log fertilizer per worker  0.033***  0.034***  0.034*** 
  (4.05) (4.30) (4.37) 
Log irrigated land share    0.050***  0.067*** 
   (3.09)  (4.10) 
Log rainfall    0.365***  0.366*** 
   (8.67)  (8.80) 
Avg years schooling      0.058*** 
     (5.21) 
Constant 5.123***  2.813***  2.774*** 
 (95.55)  (10.03)  (9.48) 
Includes Year dummies  X  X  X 
Observations 1038  1038  1038 
Number of countries  30  30  30 
R-squared 0.40  0.45  0.46 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.       




Table 5.  Regional TFP Growth Rates (Unadjusted for Input Quality) 
Region:  1960 - 1984  1985 - 2002  1960 - 2002 
   East  0.23  0.19  0.21 
   Southern  0.84  1.80  1.25 
   Middle  -2.43  0.61  -1.13 
   West  0.37  1.61  0.90 
   Sahel  -2.41  0.48  -1.17 






Table 6.  Accounting for Changes in Land and Labor Quality 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Baseline TFP  Adjusting for Land 
Quality 
Adjusting for Land 
and Labor Quality 
Mean Growth Rate  0.97  0.87  0.59 
















Table 7.  Trends in Agricultural Research Spending by Sub-Region, 1971-2000.  Originally, 




Table 8.  Pair-Wise Decompositions of Agricultural TFP 






Sample size of 
regression
c 
No. of years 
included 
No. of countries 
included 
R&D (t-10)  75  P = .044  219  11  11 
R&D (t – 5)  45  P = .06
b 274 16  11 
Paved Road Share  3  P = .47  237  11  28 
Civil War  11  P = .13
b 1037 37  28 
Black Mkt Prem.  29  P = 0.00  737  37  28 
ΔRRA(t-1)  16  P = .016  387  38  10 
a.    Baseline net of input quality adjustments            b.     One-sided t-test.   
c.  Refers to underlying estimation of production function from which TFP growth path is derived. 
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Appendix 1 – Commodities and International Prices Included  in Aggregate 
Crop Output 





































* Base year = 2006 
  87 
 
Appendix 2 – Comparison of Baseline TFP Growth Rates with Alternative 
Output Aggregates  
  The main results presented in the paper are based on an output aggregate that includes 
only crops, and that uses international prices that were calculated specifically for this African 
sample to aggregate those crops.  This appendix compares the baseline TFP growth rate 
estimates derived from that crop aggregate output with two alternative output aggregates – one 
using only crop output but using the FAOs global international prices for aggregation, and 
another using total agricultural output (from FAO) – the sum of crop and livestock output – 
aggregated with global FAO international prices.  In the latter case, I include permanent pasture 
land in the measure of land input. 
  As Figure A1 illustrates, the resulting sets of TFP growth paths tell a broadly similar 
story, though with different average TFP growth over the period. 
Mean TFP Growth Rate Estimates: 
  crop output with African international prices = 0.61%/yr 
  crop output with FAO global international prices = 0.52%/yr 
  total agricultural output with FAO global international prices = 0.74%/yr 